Abstract. Security against selective opening attack (SOA) requires that in a multi-user setting, even if an adversary has access to all ciphertexts from users, and adaptively corrupts some fraction of the users by exposing not only their messages but also the random coins, the remaining unopened messages retain their privacy. Recently, Bellare, Waters and Yilek considered SOA-security in the identity-based setting, and presented the first identity-based encryption (IBE) schemes that are proven secure against selective opening chosen plaintext attack (SO-CPA). However, how to achieve SO-CCA security for IBE is still open. In this paper, we introduce a new primitive called extractable IBE, which is a hybrid of one-bit IBE and identity-based key encapsulation mechanism (IB-KEM), and define its IND-ID-CCA security notion. We present a generic construction of SO-CCA secure IBE from an IND-ID-CCA secure extractable IBE with "One-Sided Public Openability"(1SPO), a collision-resistant hash function and a strengthened cross-authentication code. Finally, we propose two concrete constructions of extractable 1SPO-IBE schemes, resulting in the first simulation-based SO-CCA secure IBE schemes without random oracles.
-We define a new property of XAC: semi-uniqueness. If an XAC is strong and semi-unique, we say it is a strengthened XAC. We also show that the efficient construction of XAC proposed by Fehr et al. [15] is a strengthened XAC actually. -We propose a paradigm of building SIM-SO-CCA secure IBE from IND-ID-CCA secure extractable 1SPO-IBE, collision-resistant hash function and strengthened XAC. Our approach follows the line of [15] , which achieves SIM-SO-CCA secure PKE from hash proof systems with explainable domains and XAC. Our result further highlights the significance of Fehr et al.'s work [15] in achieving SIM-SO-CCA security. -We construct extractable 1SPO-IBE schemes without random oracles by adapting anonymous IBEs, including the anonymous extension of Lewko-Waters IBE scheme [25] by De Caro, Iovino and Persiano [13] and the Boyen-Waters anonymous IBE [9] .
Extractable 1SPO-IBE. Extractable IBE combines one-bit IBE and identity-based key encapsulation mechanism (IB-KEM). The message space of extractable IBE is {0, 1}. An encryption of 1 under identity ID also encapsulates a session key K, behaving like IB-KEM. More precisely, (C, K) ← Encrypt ex (PK ex , ID, 1; R) and C ← Encrypt ex (PK ex , ID, 0; R ′ ), where PK ex is the public parameter and R, R ′ are the randomness used in encryption. If C is from the encryption of 1 under ID, the decryption algorithm, (b, K) ← Decrypt ex (PK, SK ID , C), is able to use the private key SK ID to recover message b = 1 as well as the encapsulated session key K. As for an encryption of 0, say C = Encrypt ex (PK ex , ID, 0; R ′ ), the decryption algorithm can recover message b = 0 but generate a uniformly random key K as well.
The security of extractable IBE requires that given a challenge ciphertext C * and a challenge key K * under some identity ID * , no PPT adversary can distinguish, except with negligible advantage, whether C * is an encryption of 1 under identity ID * and K * is the encapsulated key of C * , or C * is an encryption of 0 under identity ID * and K * is a uniformly random key, even if the adversary has access to a key generation oracle for private key SK ID with ID ̸ = ID * and a decryption oracle to decrypt ciphertexts other than C * under IDWe give a high-level description on how to construct a SIM-SO-CCA secure IBE scheme from an extractable 1SPO-IBE scheme characterized by (Encrypt ex , Decrypt ex ), with the help of a collisionresistant hash function H and a strengthened ℓ + 1-cross-authentication code XAC.
First, we roughly recall the notion of cross-authentication code XAC, which was introduced in [15] . In an ℓ + 1-cross-authentication code XAC, an authentication tag T can be computed from a list of random keys K 1 , . . . , K ℓ+1 (without a designated message) using algorithm XAuth. The XVer algorithm is used to verify the correctness of the tag T with any single key K. If K is from the list, XVer will output 1. If K is uniformly randomly chosen, XVer will output 1 with negligible probability. If an XAC is strong and semi-unique, we say it is a strengthened XAC. Strongness of XAC means given (K i ) 1≤i≤ℓ+1,i̸ =j and T , a new keyK j which is statistically indistinguishable to K i , can be efficiently sampled. Semi-uniqueness of XAC requires that K can be parsed to (K a , K b ) and for a fixed T and K a , there is at most one K b satisfying XVer((K a , K b ), T ) = 1. The security notion of (strengthened) XAC requires resistance to substitution attacks, i.e., given T = XAuth(K 1 , . . . , K ℓ+1 ) and (K i ) 1≤i≤ℓ+1,i̸ =j , the probability that XVer(K j , T ′ ) = 1 is negligible if T ′ ̸ = T.
Our cryptosystem has message space {0, 1} ℓ , and encryption of an ℓ-bit message M = m 1 ∥ · · · ∥m ℓ for an identity ID is performed bitwise, with one ciphertext element per bit. For each bit m i , the corresponding ciphertext element C i is an encryption of m i under ID, which is generated by the encryption algorithm of the extractable 1SPO-IBE scheme. As shown in [26] , a scheme which encrypts long message bit-by-bit is vulnerable to quoting attacks. Hence, we use a collision-resistant hash function and a strengthened ℓ + 1-cross-authentication code XAC to bind C 1 , . . . , C ℓ together to resist quoting attacks.
Specifically, let K a be a public parameter, in our SIM-SO-CCA secure IBE scheme, encryption of an ℓ-bit message M = m 1 ∥ · · · ∥m ℓ ∈ {0, 1} ℓ for an identity ID is given by the ciphertext CT = (C 1 , . . . , C ℓ , T ), where
Here C i is from the extractable 1SPO-IBE encryption of bit m i , and K i is the encapsulated key or randomly chosen key depending on m i = 1 or 0. Finally, XAC tag T glues all the C i s together. Given a ciphertext CT = (C 1 , . . . , C ℓ , T ) for identity ID, the decryption algorithm first checks whether We assume that the key space X K of the strengthened XAC and the session key space K of the extractable 1SPO-IBE are identical (i.e., K=X K), and K is efficiently samplable and explainable domain.
As for the SIM-SO-CCA security of the IBE scheme, the proving line is to show that encryptions of ℓ ones are "equivocable" ciphertexts, which can be opened to arbitrary messages, and the "equivocable" ciphertexts are computationally indistinguishable from real challenge ciphertexts in an SOA setting, i.e., even if the adversary is given access to a corruption oracle to get the opened messages and randomness, a decryption oracle to decrypt ciphertexts and a key generation oracle to obtain private keys. If so, a PPT SOA-simulator can be constructed to create "equivocable" ciphertexts (i.e., encryptions of ℓ ones) as challenge ciphertexts, then open them accordingly, and SIM-SO-CCA security follows.
To prove a challenge ciphertext CT = (C 1 , . . . , C ℓ , T ) under ID, which encrypts m 1 ∥ · · · ∥m ℓ , is indistinguishable from encryption of ℓ ones in the SOA setting, we use hybrid argument. For each m i = 0, we replace (C i , K i ) (which is used to create CT under ID) with an extractable 1SPO-IBE encryption of 1. If this replacement is distinguishable to an adversary A, then another PPT algorithm B can simulate SOA-environment for A by setting (C i , K i ) to be its own challenge (C * , K * ) under ID, and use A to break the IND-ID-CCA security of the extractable 1SPO-IBE. The subtlety lies in how B deals with A's decryption query CT = ( C 1 , . . . , C l , T ) under ID with C j = C * for some j ∈ [ℓ] . Recall that B is not allowed to issue a private key query ⟨ID⟩ or a decryption query ⟨ID, C * ⟩ to it's own challenger in the extractable 1SPO-IBE security game. In this case, B will resort to XAC to set m ′′ j = XVer(K * , T ). Observe that, if (C * , K * ) = Encrypt ex (PK ex , ID, 1), then m ′′ j = XVer(K * , T ) = 1, which is exactly the same as the output of Decrypt algorithm. If C * = Encrypt ex (PK ex , ID, 0) and K * is random, then m ′′ j = XVer(K * , T ) = 0 except with negligible probability, due to XAC's security against substitution attacks. This is also consistent with the output of the decryption algorithm, except with negligible probability. Hence, with overwhelming probability, B simulates SOA-environment for A properly. Note that to apply XAC's security against substitution attacks, we require:
1. T ̸ = T , which is guaranteed by XAC's semi-unique property and collision resistance of hash function. 2. K * should not be revealed to adversary A. Therefore, in the corruption phase, if B is asked to open (C * , K * ), it first resamples aK, which is statistically indistinguishable from K * . This is guaranteed by the strongness of XAC. Then, C will be opened to 0 with algorithm POpen, and K (instead of K * ) is opened with a suitable randomness.
Construction of Extractable 1SPO-IBE. In [3] , Bellare et al. proposed two one-bit 1SPO-IBEs, one based on the anonymous extension of Lewko-Waters IBE scheme [25] by De Caro, Iovino and Persiano [13] and the other based on the Boyen-Waters anonymous IBE [9] . Both schemes rely on a pairing e : G × G → G T . The 1SPO property of the two one-bit IBE schemes is guaranteed by the fact that G is an efficiently samplable and explainable domain, which is characterized by two PPT algorithms Sample and Sample −1 for group G. More precisely, Sample chooses an element g from G uniformly at random, and Sample −1 (G, g) will output a uniformly distributed R subject to g = Sample(G; R). Details of algorithms Sample and Sample −1 are given in [3] . A ciphertext of one-bit 1SPO-IBEs in [3] consists of several group elements in G. Those elements are structured if the ciphertext is an encryption of 1 under some identity ID, and this structure can be detected by the private key SK ID but not without it 1 . An encryption of 0 is comprised of random elements in G, which are generated by algorithm Sample. Given a ciphertext for ID, the decryption algorithm uses the private key SK ID to check whether the ciphertext has a certain structure. If yes, it outputs message 1; otherwise, it outputs message 0. As for the 1SPO property, the algorithm POpen obtains randomness by applying Sample −1 to each group element from an encryption of 0. Unfortunately, the one-bit 1SPO-IBE schemes in [3] are not extractable IBEs. No session keys can be extracted from encryptions of 1, and the schemes are vulnerable to chosen-ciphertext attacks. Therefore, we have to resort to new techniques for extractable 1SPO-IBE.
We start from anonymous IBE schemes in [13, 9] . Recall that an encryption of a message M for an identity ID in anonymous IBEs [13, 9] takes the form of
where PK denotes the system's public parameter, α is the master secret key, s, s 0 , s 1 are the randomness used in the encryption algorithm, f 0 , f 1 are two efficient functions and each of c 0 , c 1 denotes one or several elements in G. The private key SK ID is structured such that pairings with group elements of (c 1 , c 2 ) result in e(g, g) αs , hence the message M can be recovered from c 2 .
The idea of constructing extractable 1SPO-IBE is summerized as follows. Firstly, we generate ciphertexts of the form
where
and H is a collision-resistant hash function. The ciphertext is similar to Eq.(1), except that it is a 2-hierarchical extension with respect to (ID, ID ′ ). The structure of (c ′ 0 , c ′ 1 ) is characterized by the shared randomness s and this structure can be publicly verified. The master secret key is now (α, β). Correspondingly the private key SK ID = (SK ID,1 , SK ID,2 ), and SK ID,i (i = 1, 2) are generated by the master secret key α and β respectively, in a similar way as that in the anonymous IBEs [13, 9] 
which satisfies the following properties: We emphasize that the 2-hierarchical IBE structure (when encrypting 1) helps to answer decryption queries in the IND-ID-CCA security proof of the above extractable 1SPO-IBE. In the private key SK ID = (SK ID,1 , SK ID,2 ), SK ID,2 is used to generate the encapsulated key e(g, g) βs when encrypting 1, and SK ID,1 is used to generate a blind factor e(g, g) αs , which helps to convert the publicly verifiable structure of (c ′ 0 , c ′ 1 ) to a privately verifiable structure, resulting in IND-ID-CCA secure extractable 1SPO-IBE.
Related Work. Non-committing encryption (NCE) [12] was introduced by Canetti, Feige, Goldreich and Naor [12] to achieve adaptively secure multi-party computation. In NCE schemes there is a simulator, which can generate non-committing ciphertexts, and later open them to any desired message. In [11] , Canetti, Dwork, Naor and Ostrovsky extended the notion of NCE to a new primitive which they called deniable encryption. In deniable encryption schemes, a sender may open a ciphertext to an arbitrary message by providing coins produced by a faking algorithm. A weak form of deniable encryption is that encryptions of 1 can be opened as encryptions of 0 even if not vice versa, and 1SPO-IBE is an IBE analogue of this notion. We refer the reader to [3] for more discussions on NCE and deniable encryption.
Organization. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Some preliminaries are given in Section 2. We introduce the notion and security model of extractable 1SPO-IBE in Section 3. The notion of strengthened XAC and its efficient construction are given in Section 4. We propose a paradigm of building SIM-SO-CCA secure IBE from IND-ID-CCA secure extractable 1SPO-IBE, collision-resistant hash function and strengthened XAC in Section 5. We present two IND-ID-CCA secure extractable 1SPO-IBE schemes in Section 6. The notion of composite order bilinear groups and complexity assumptions we use are given in Appendix A. In Appendix B and C, we give the formal notion of IBE and the simulation-based definition of IBE secure against a selective opening chosen-ciphertext adversary respectively.
Preliminaries
If S is a set, then s 1 , . . . , s t ← S denotes the operation of picking elements s 1 , . . . , s t uniformly at random from S. If n ∈ N then [n] denotes the set {1, . . . , n}. For i ∈ {0, 1} * , |i| denotes the bitlength of i. If x 1 , x 2 , . . . are strings, then x 1 ∥x 2 ∥ · · · denotes their concatenation. For a probabilistic algorithm A, we denote y ← A(x; R) the process of running A on input x and with randomness R, and assigning y the result. Let R A denote the randomness space of A, and we write y ← A(x) for y ← A(x; R) with R chosen from R A uniformly at random. A function f (κ) is negligible, if for every c > 0 there exists a κ c such that f (κ) < 1/κ c for all κ > κ c .
Key Derivation Functions
A family of key derivation functions [14] 
The above definition is for presentation simplicity. In general, the index i should be generated by a PPT sampler algorithm on the security parameter κ. For notational convenience, we ignore the index i of a key derivation function.
Efficiently samplable and explainable domain
A domain D is efficiently samplable and explainable [15] Formally, an extractable identity-based encryption (extractable IBE) scheme consists of the following four algorithms:
Setup ex (1 κ ) takes as input a security parameter κ. It generates a public parameter PK and a master secret key MSK. The public parameter PK defines an identity space ID, a ciphertext space C and a session key space K. KeyGen ex (PK, MSK, ID) takes as input the public parameter PK, the master secret key MSK and an identity ID ∈ ID. It produces a private key SK ID for the identity ID. Encrypt ex (PK, ID, m) takes as input the public parameter PK, an identity ID ∈ ID and a message m ∈ {0, 1}. It outputs a ciphertext C if m = 0, and outputs a ciphertext and a session key (C, K) if m = 1. Here K ∈ K. Decrypt ex (PK, SK ID , C) takes as input the public parameter PK, a private key SK ID and a ciphertext C ∈ C. It outputs a message m ′ ∈ {0, 1} and a session key K ′ ∈ K.
Correctness. An extractable IBE scheme has completeness error ϵ, if for all κ, ID ∈ ID, m ∈ {0, 1},
-The probability that m ′ = m is at least 1 − ϵ, where the probability is taken over the coins used in encryption.
Security. The IND-ID-CCA security of extractable IBE is twisted from IND-ID-CCA security of onebit IBE and IND-ID-CCA security of identity-based key encapsulation mechanism (IB-KEM). The security notion is defined using the following game between a PPT adversary A and a challenger.
Setup
The challenger runs Setup ex (1 κ ) to obtain a public parameter PK and a master secret key MSK. It gives the public parameter PK to the adversary. 
Strengthened Cross-authentication Codes
In this section, we first review the notion and security requirements of cross-authentication codes introduced in [15] . Then we define a new property of cross-authentication codes: semi-unique. If a cross-authentication code is strong and semi-unique, we say it is a strengthened cross-authentication code, which will play an important role in our construction of SIM-SO-CCA secure IBE. Finally, we will show that the efficient construction of cross-authentication code proposed by Fehr et al. [15] is actually a strengthened cross-authentication code. max is over all T ′ ∈ X T , and 
Next, we review the efficient construction of L-cross-authentication code secure against impersonation and substitution attacks proposed by Fehr et al. [15] , and show that it is strong and semi-unique as well, i.e. it is a strengthened XAC. 
outputs 1 if and only if T ̸ =⊥ and poly T (a) = b.
and (a j , b j ) j̸ =i , both of (a, b) and (a i , b i ) are uniformly distributed over the same support.
5 Proposed SIM-SO-CCA Secure IBE Scheme Let (Setup ex , KeyGen ex , Encrypt ex , Decrypt ex ) be an extractable 1SPO-IBE scheme with identity space ID, ciphertext space C and session key space K = K a × K b , and (XGen, XAuth, XVer) be a strengthened ℓ + 1-cross-authentication code XAC with key space X K = K = K a × K b and tag space X T . We require that key space K is also an efficiently samplable and explainable domain 3 associated with algorithms Sample ′ and Sample ′−1 . Our cryptosystem has message space {0, 1} ℓ .
Our scheme consists of the following algorithms:
3 As mentioned in [15] , the efficiently samplable and explainable key space K can be assumed without loss of generality, because K can always be efficiently mapped into K ′ = {0, 1} l by means of a suitable (almost) balanced function, such that uniform distribution in K induces (almost) uniform distribution in K ′ , and where l is linear in log(|K|).
Setup(1 κ ) : The setup algorithm first chooses K a ← K a and a collision-resistant hash function 
except with probability fail XAC by correctness of XAC. On the other hand, if m i = 0, the ϵ-completeness of the extractable 1SPO-IBE guarantees m ′ i = 0 (hence m ′′ i = 0) with probability at least 1 − ϵ. Consequently, for any CT ← Encrypt(PK, ID, M ), we have Decrypt(PK, SK ID , CT ) = M except with probability at most ℓ · max{fail XAC , ϵ}. 
Proposed IND-ID-CCA Secure Extractable 1SPO-IBE Scheme
In this section, we propose a concrete construction of extractable 1SPO-IBE from the anonymous IBE [13] in a composite order bilinear group. (In Appendix F, we show how to construct an extractable 1SPO-IBE from Boyen-Waters anonymous HIBE [9] , which is based on a prime order bilinear group.) The design principle has already been described in the Introduction.
The proposed scheme consists of the following algorithms:
and a key derivation function KDF :
The master secret key is MSK = (g, g 3 , α, β). We require the group G be an efficiently samplable and explainable domain associated with algorithms Sample and Sample −1 . Details on how to instantiate such groups are given in [3] .
this is done by raising g 3 to a random power). Output the private key
, where
where 
as a private key associated to the 2-level identity ID = (ID, ID ′ ).) Then, check whether e(c 1 /g
If not, set m = 0 and choose a session key K ← G T . Otherwise, set m = 1 and compute
Output (m, K).
so decryption always succeeds. On the other hand, if C = (c 0 , c 1 ) is an encryption of 0 under identity ID, then c 0 , c 1 ∈ G are chosen uniformly at random, thus Pr[e(c 1 /g
where κ is the security parameter. So the completeness error is 
One-Sided Public Openability (1SPO).
If C = (c 0 , c 1 ) is an encryption of 0 under identity ID, then c 0 and c 1 are both randomly distributed in G. Since the group G is an efficiently samplable and explainable domain associated with Sample and Sample
Security. We now state the security theorem of our proposed extractable IBE scheme. 
A Composite Order Bilinear Groups
We review the notion of composite order bilinear groups, introduced in [8] firstly. Let G be an N -order group generator algorithm that takes as input a security parameter κ and outputs a tuple (
We further require that multiplication in G and G T , as well as the bilinear map e, are computable in time polynomial in κ. For S ⊆ [4] we let G ∏ i∈S p i denote the unique subgroups of G having order ∏ i∈S p i . Note also that if g and h are group elements of different co-prime order, then e(g, h) = 1 G T . We now state the complexity assumptions we use. Assumptions 1, 2 ,3 and 6 are some instantiations of the General Subgroup Decision (GSD) assumption defined in [3] . Assumption 4 and 5 are essentially the same as Assumption 2 and 3 in [13] .
Assumption 1 Let G be as above. We define the following distribution:
(p 1 , p 2 , p 3 , p 4 , G, G T , e) ← G(κ), N = p 1 p 2 p 3 p 4 , g, X 1 ← G p 1 , X 2 , Y 2 , Z 2 ← G p 2 , g 3 , Y 3 ← G p 3 , g 4 , Z 4 ← G p 4 , D = (G, G T , e, N, g, g 3 , g 4 , X 1 X 2 , Y 2 Y 3 , Z 2 Z 4 ), T 1 ← G p 1 p 3 p 4 , T 2 ← G p 1 p 2 p 3 p 4 .
The advantage of an algorithm A in breaking Assumption 1 is defined as
Adv 1 A (κ) = |Pr[A(D, T 1 ) = 1] − Pr[A(D, T 2 ) = 1]|.
Definition 5 we say G satisfies Assumption 1 if for any polynomial time algorithm
A, Adv 1 A (κ) is negligible.
Assumption 2 Let G be as above. We define the following distribution:
(p 1 , p 2 , p 3 , p 4 , G, G T , e) ← G(κ), N = p 1 p 2 p 3 p 4 , g ← G p 1 , g 3 ← G p 3 , g 4 ← G p 4 , D = (G, G T , e, N, g, g 3 , g 4 ), T 1 ← G p 1 , T 2 ← G p 1 p 2 .
The advantage of an algorithm A in breaking Assumption 2 is defined as
Adv 2 A (κ) = |Pr[A(D, T 1 ) = 1] − Pr[A(D, T 2 ) = 1]|.
Definition 6 we say G satisfies Assumption 2 if for any polynomial time algorithm
Assumption 3 Let G be as above. We define the following distribution:
The advantage of an algorithm A in breaking Assumption 3 is defined as
Adv 3 A (κ) = |Pr[A(D, T 1 ) = 1] − Pr[A(D, T 2 ) = 1]|.
Definition 7 we say G satisfies Assumption 3 if for any polynomial time algorithm A, Adv 3
A (κ) is negligible.
Assumption 4 Let G be as above. We define the following distribution:
(p 1 , p 2 , p 3 , p 4 , G, G T , e) ← G(κ), N = p 1 p 2 p 3 p 4 , a, s ∈ Z N , g ← G p 1 , g 2 , X 2 , Y 2 ← G p 2 , g 3 ← G p 3 , g 4 ← G p 4 , D = (G, G T , e, N, g, g 2 , g 3 , g 4 , g a X 2 , g s Y 2 ), T 1 = e(g, g) as , T 2 ← G T .
The advantage of an algorithm A in breaking Assumption 4 is defined as
Adv 4 A (κ) = |Pr[A(D, T 1 ) = 1] − Pr[A(D, T 2 ) = 1]|.
Definition 8 we say G satisfies Assumption 4 if for any polynomial time algorithm
A, Adv 4 A (κ) is negligible.
Assumption 5 Let G be as above. We define the following distribution:
(p 1 , p 2 , p 3 , p 4 , G, G T , e) ← G(κ), N = p 1 p 2 p 3 p 4 , s ∈ Z N , g, u, v, h ← G p 1 , g 2 , A 2 ← G p 2 , g 3 ← G p 3 , g 4 , W 4 ← G p 4 , B 24 , X 24 , Y 24 , E 24 ← G p 2 p 4 , D = (G, G T , e, N, gW 4 , gA 2 , u, u s B 24 , v, v s X 24 , h, h s Y 24 , g 2 , g 3 , g 4 ), T 1 = g s E 24 , T 2 ← G p 1 p 2 p 4 .
The advantage of an algorithm A in breaking Assumption 5 is defined as
Adv 5 A (κ) = |Pr[A(D, T 1 ) = 1] − Pr[A(D, T 2 ) = 1]|.
Definition 9 we say G satisfies Assumption 5 if for any polynomial time algorithm
Assumption 6 Let G be as above. We define the following distribution:
The advantage of an algorithm A in breaking Assumption 6 is defined as
Adv 6 A (κ) = |Pr[A(D, T 1 ) = 1] − Pr[A(D, T 2 ) = 1]|.
Definition 10 we say G satisfies Assumption 6 if for any polynomial time algorithm A, Adv 6
Assumption 7 (Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Assumption) Let G be as above. We define the following distribution:
(p 1 , p 2 , p 3 , p 4 , G, G T , e) ← G(κ), N = p 1 p 2 p 3 p 4 , x, y ← Z N , g ← G p 1 , g 2 ← G p 2 , g 3 ← G p 3 , g 4 ← G p 4 , D = (G, G T , e, p 1 , p 2 , p 3 , p 4 , g, g 2 , g 3 , g 4 , g x , g y ).
The advantage of an algorithm A in breaking CDH Assumption in G p 1 is defined as
Definition 11 we say G satisfies CDH Assumption in
B Identity-Based Encryption
An IBE scheme consists of the following four algorithms:
Setup(1 κ ) takes as input a security parameter κ. It generates a public parameter PK and a master secret key MSK. KeyGen(PK, MSK, ID) takes as input the public parameter PK, the master secret key MSK and an identity ID. It outputs a private key SK ID for the identity ID. Encrypt(PK, ID, M ) takes as input the public parameter PK, an identity ID and a message M . It outputs a ciphertext CT . Decrypt(PK, SK ID , CT ) takes as input the public parameter PK, a private key SK ID and a ciphertext CT . It outputs either a message M or a failure symbol ⊥.
An IBE scheme has completeness error ϵ if Decrypt(PK, SK ID , Encrypt(PK, ID, M )) = M holds with probability at least 1−ϵ for all ID and M , (PK, MSK) ← Setup(1 κ ) and SK ID ← KeyGen(PK, MSK, ID), where the probability is taken over the coins used in encryption.
C Selective Opening Secure Identity-Based Encryption
We recall a simulation-based definition of IBE secure against a selective opening chosen-ciphertext adversary that was originally formalized in [3] . Note that, the model considers adaptive sender corruptions and non-adaptive receiver corruptions. Here an n-message sampler M is a randomized algorithm that on input string α ∈ {0, 1} * outputs an n-vector M = (M (1) , . . . , M (n) ) of messages, and a relation R is any randomized algorithm that outputs a single bit. 
Definition 12 An identity-based encryption scheme
] .
Note that, we require that A never query KeyGen(·) on a challenge identity ID
(i) and Decrypt(·, ·) on a challenge ciphertext (ID (i) , CT (i) ). Game so-cca-real IBE,A,n,M,R (κ) (PK, MSK) ← Setup(1 κ ); ((ID (i) ) i∈[n] , α) ← A KeyGen(·),Decrypt(·,·) (PK); (M (i) ) i∈[n] ← M(α); R (1) , . . . , R (n) ← R Encrypt ; (CT (i) ) i∈[n] = (Encrypt(PK, ID (i) , M (i) ; R (i) )) i∈[n] ; I ← A KeyGen(·),Decrypt(·,·) ((CT (i) ) i∈[n] ); out A ← A KeyGen(·),Decrypt(·,·) ((M (i) , R (i) ) i∈I ); return R((ID (i) ) i∈[n] , (M (i) ) i∈[n] , I, out A ). Game so-ideal IBE,S,n,M,R (κ) ((ID (i) ) i∈[n] , α) ← S; (M (i) ) i∈[n] ← M(α); I ← S; out S ← S((M (i) ) i∈I ); return R((ID (i) ) i∈[n] , (M (i) ) i∈[n] , I, out S ).
D Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. We first show that encryptions of ℓ 1 · · · 1 are computational indistinguishable to encryptions of real messages in the SOA setting. We consider the following games (for k from 1 to nℓ):
Game 0 : This is the real SIM-SO-CCA security game Game
It is the same as Game 0 except for two differences. The first difference is the way of creating the vector of challenge ciphertexts, where the first k bits sampled from M (possibly across many messages) are replaced by 1s. The second one is how the adversary A's corruption query is answered.
-When adversary A queries the encryption oracle for challenge ciphertexts, the challenger responds in this way:
For each i ∈ [n] such that i ̸ = ζ, the challenger sets
3. Finally, the challenger returns (CT (i) ) i∈ [n] to the adversary A as its challenge ciphertexts.
At the same time, for i ∈ [n], j ∈ [ℓ], the challenger also records all the random coins R 
are prepared as follows.
j are the original random coins that the challenger used to generate (C
. This behaves just like that in Game 0 .
2. Else (i.e., (i − 1)ℓ + j ≤ k), the challenger sets
whereK
Recall that ReSamp is the resample algorithm of strengthened cross authentication code XAC.
We will prove that for 1 ≤ k ≤ nℓ, Game k−1 and Game k are computationally indistinguishable in Lemma 1. Then Game 0 and Game nℓ are also computationally indistinguishable by hybrid argument. Observe that, in Game nℓ , when the adversary queries the encryption oracle for challenge ciphertexts, all messages from M are completely ignored and each challenge ciphertext is an encryption of message ℓ 1 · · · 1. This results in a PPT-simulator S for A in Game nℓ .
Setup
The simulator S first runs the algorithm Setup to generate the public parameter PK = (PK ex , H, K a ) and the master secret key MSK = MSK ex . Then, it sends PK to A. Query The adversary A adaptively issues key and decryption queries, and S answers the queries with the help of the master secret key MSK. Challenge At some point, A queries the encryption oracle on ((ID (i) ) i∈ [n] , α) for challenge ciphertexts. S forwards the query to its own oracle, receiving nothing in response. S then generates ciphertexts (CT (i) ) i∈ [n] , where each ciphertext is an encryption of message can be opened to any message andR (i) can be found by S with Eq.(7).) Finally, S sends (M (i) ,R (i) ) i∈I to A. Output The adversary A halts with output out A , and S halts with the same output.
Obviously, S can serves as the soa-simulator in Game so-ideal IBE,S,n,M,R , so we have that
.
To sum up, we get that Pr [ Game
is negligible, which proves the theorem. Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A that can distinguish Game k and Game k−1 with nonnegligible advantage. We build an algorithm B that breaks IND-ID-CCA security of the extractable 1SPO-IBE scheme with non-negligible advantage. In the IND-ID-CCA security game of the extractable 1SPO-IBE scheme, B is given a public parameter, and also is provided with an encryption oracle for challenge ciphertext, a key generation oracle and a decryption oracle by its own challenger. Now B simulates an environment for A.
Lemma 1 If the extractable 1SPO-IBE scheme is IND-ID-CCA
Recall
When n messages are sampled from M, we get totally nℓ bits. In formula, (
Then the index k will locate bit m 
. 3. B prepares the vector of challenge ciphertexts for A.
(a) For i ∈ [n] such that i ̸ = ζ, B sets
where are prepared as follows.
j are the original random coins that B used to generate (C
Private Key Query & Decryption Query. B answers the adversary A's private key and decryption queries as follows.
-A's private key query on ID. Since A is not allowed to query any
. B can query its own key generation oracle on ID to obtain the private key SK ID , and sends it to A.
, B queries its own key generation oracle on ⟨ ID⟩ to obtain the private key SK ID , decrypts CT with SK ID and algorithm Decrypt, and sends the result to A.
. B proceeds as follows.
, B does the following:
• In case of C j ̸ = C * , B queries its own decryption oracle with
, and sets
• In case of C j = C * (Recall that B is not allowed to query ⟨ID (ζ) = ID, C * ⟩ to its own decryption oracle), B sets Observe that, if C * is an encryption of 0 and K * is uniformly distributed in K, the differences between the environment simulated by B and Game k−1 lie in:
ϱ is an encryption of 0, and
ϱ is the random coins used to obtain C 
share the same probability distribution, hence they are statistically indistinguishable, i.e.
On the other hand, sinceK
w ) 1≤w≤ℓ+1,w̸ =ϱ , T (ζ) ), the resample algorithm of XAC guaranteed that conditioned on T (ζ) and (K
) conditioned on CT (ζ) and other opened information. 2. Different way to compute bit m ′′ j for decryption query
= C * is an encryption of 0, hence decryption of C j will result in message bit m ′ j = 0 and a random key K ′ j , except with negligible probability. Consequently, m ′′ j = 0 except with negligible probability.
-In the environment simulated by B, m ′′ j is computed as
Next, we show that m ′′ j = 0 except with negligible probability. We first show that if ID = ID (ζ) and CT ̸ = CT (ζ) , then T = T (ζ) with negligible probability, due to the collision resistance of hash function H. The reason is as follows. Recall that, XVer ((K a , H( ID, C 1 , . . . , C ℓ )), T ) = 1.
On the other hand, K
Since the ℓ + 1-cross-authentication code XAC is semi-unique, it follows from Eqs. (8) and (9) that
The fact that
Eqs. (10) and (11) To sum up, m ′′ j will be decrypted to 0, except with negligible probability, no matter in Game k−1 or the environment simulated by B.
E Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. Following the approach by Lewko and Waters [25], we define two additional structures: semi-functional ciphertexts and semi-functional keys. These will not be used in the real system, but will be used in our proof. 
Semi-functional Ciphertext
Semi-functional Key A semi-functional key will take one of two forms. To create a semi-functional key, we first use the key generation algorithm to form a normal key (ID,
The semi-functional key of type 1 is set as:
The semi-functional key of type 2 is set as:
Let q denote the total number of key and decryption queries the adversary makes. We will prove the IND-ID-CCA security of our scheme using a hybrid argument over a sequence of games.
Game Real The real IND-ID-CCA security game. If E 1 happens with non-negligible probability, we construct a PPT algorithm B that breaks Assumption 1 with non-negligible probability. Observe that, given G, G T , e, N , g, g 3 , g 4 -Event E 2 : the adversary makes a decryption query ⟨ID, C⟩ such that ID = ID * , C = (c 0 , c 1 ), c 0 = c * 0 and c 1 ̸ = c * 1 , but the challenger responds with (1, K) in Game Restricted 1 . Recall that in Game Restricted 2 , the challenger returns message 0 and a random session key for such a query, while in Game Restricted 1 , the challenge will employ decryption algorithm to answer the query. We will show that E 2 occurs with negligible probability in Game Restricted 1 . In Game Restricted 1 , if δ = 1, Decrypt ex (PK, SK ID , C) always outputs bit 0 and a random session key, and E 2 never occurs in this case. Therefore, if E 2 happens, we must have δ = 0 in Game Restricted 1 . We will construct a PPT algorithm B to solve the CDH problem over G p 1 , if E 2 happens with non-negligible probability. B is given (G, G T , e, p 1 , p 2 , p 3 , p 4 , g, g 2 , g 3 , g 4 , g x , g y ) and going to compute g xy . B simulates Game Restricted 1 to the adversary as follows. Set N = p 1 p 2 p 3 p 4 and choose α, β, η u , η v , η h , γ u , γ v , γ h , γ w ∈ Z N uniformly at random, a collision-resistant hash function H : Z N × G → Z N and a key derivation function KDF :
, and sends the adversary the public parameter:
Note that B knows the master secret key MSK = (g, g 3 , α, β) associated with PK, thus is able to answer the key generation and decryption queries made by the adversary with the help of MSK. When the adversary submits the target identity ID * , B sends (C * = (c * 0 , c * 1 ), K * ) to the adversary, where
and t 2 , t 3 , t 4 ∈ Z N are chosen uniformly at random. Since δ = 0, then from the adversary's point of view, the distribution of (C * , K * ) is identical to that in Game Restricted 1 . Suppose E 2 happens during the simulation, i.e., the adversary makes a decryption query for 
, and sends A the public parameter:
Note that B knows the master secret key MSK = (g, g 3 , α, β) associated with PK, and B can answers the key and decryption queries of A with the help of MSK.
At some point, A sends B a challenge identity ID * . B chooses δ ← {0, 1} and does the following. If δ = 0, it chooses c * 0 , c * 1 ← G and K * ← G T ; otherwise, it chooses t 4 ← Z N and sets 
α , e(g, g) β , H, KDF). 
Let us now explain how B answers the i-th query made by
Then 
Then, B uses SK ID to respond to A's query.
At some point, A sends B a target identity ID * . B chooses δ ← {0, 1} and does the following. If δ = 0, it chooses c * 0 , c * 1 ← G and K * ← G T ; otherwise (i.e., δ = 1), it chooses t 4 ← Z N and sets
where ID * ′ = H(ID * , c * 0 ). Finally, B sends the challenge ciphertext C * = (c * 0 , c * 1 ) and session key K * to A.
Next, we will show that the challenge ciphertext and SK ID appearing in the response of A's k-th query are properly distributed. The key point is to show that
3 , then the first three components of SK ID appearing in the response of A's k-th query are
Their distribution is exactly the same as that in the normal key.
On the other hand, 
We want to prove that the private key SK ID is a properly distributed semi-functional key of type 1 and the challenge ciphertext is a properly distributed semi-functional ciphertext. It suffices to prove that (
where (x) p 2 denotes x mod p 2 . This is justified by the following facts.
are uniformly distributed over Z p 2 , due to Chinese Remainder Theorem. -The 3 by 3 matrix on the right side has full rank as long as
(b) The k-th query is a decryption query of ⟨ID, C = (c 0 , c 1 )⟩.
-If ID = ID * and c 0 = c * 0 , B returns bit 0 and a random session key without using the private key SK ID . This is consistent to the correct answer from decryption, except with negligible probability (Recall that we have proved in Lemma 3 that event E 2 happens with negligible probability). Hence, no information about SK ID is leaked and (γ u ID * + γ v ID * ′ +γ h ) p 2 is uniformly distributed over Z p 2 according to Chinese Remainder Theorem.
, grgr ′′ 3 3 ) to answer this decryption query according to Eq.(4), Eq. (5), Eq.(6).
The 2 by 3 matrix on the right side of the above equation has rank 2 as long as (ID,
, and the challenge ciphertext has the same distribution as the semi-functional ciphertext. In both cases, B properly simulated Game k,1 . Proof. This proof is very similar to the proof of the previous lemma. Suppose there exists an algorithm A that distinguishes Game k,1 and Game k,2 . Then we can build an algorithm B with non-negligible advantage in breaking Assumption 3. B is given G, G T , e, N , g, X 1 X 2 , Y 2 Y 3 , g 3 , g 4 , T and will simulate Game k,1 or Game k,2 with A. First B chooses α, β, γ u , γ v , γ h , γ w ∈ Z N uniformly at random, a collision-resistant hash function H : Z N × G → Z N and a key derivation function KDF :
Hence, if
α , e(g, g) β , H, KDF).
Let us now explain how B answers the i-th query made by A, which is a key query for ⟨ID⟩ or a decryption query for ⟨ID, C⟩.
Then, B uses SK ID to respond A's query.
At some point, A sends B a challenge identity ID * . B sends the challenge ciphertext C * = (c * 0 , c * 1 ) and session key K * , which are constructed exactly as in the previous lemma, to A.
The rest of analysis is just like that in the previous lemma. It is clear that, if T is a random element of G p 1 p 2 p 4 , then B has properly simulated Game Final 3 . If T is a random element of G, then B has properly simulated Game Final 4 . Hence, B can use the output of A to distinguish between two possibilities for T .
Lemma 7 Suppose that G satisfies Assumption 4. Then Game

F Extractable 1SPO-IBE Based on Boyen-Waters Anonymous HIBE
In this Appendix, we first show how to construct an extractable 1SPO-IBE from Boyen-Waters anonymous HIBE [9] , which is based on a prime order bilinear group. Then, based on some mild complexity assumptions, we prove that the proposed extractable 1SPO-IBE scheme is IND-sID-CCA secure. One may modify it to achieve full security using the method proposed in Water's IBE scheme [29] .
Specifically, the proposed scheme consists of the following algorithms:
Setup ex (1 κ ): Generate a bilinear group (G, G T , e, p) with the security parameter κ, where e : G × G → G T is a non-degenerate bilinear map, and G, G T are cyclic groups of prime order p.
The public parameter is
The master secret key is MSK = (g α , g β , {g a i , g b i , g a i b i θ i,j } 0≤i≤3,0≤j≤2 ) . We require the group G is an efficiently samplable and explainable domain associated with algorithms Sample and Sample −1 . Details on how to instantiate such groups are given in [3] .
where , {c i,(a) , c i,(b) } 0≤i≤3 , c 2 ) .
. . , c 3,(a) , c 3,(b) ), and 
Output (m, K).
Correctness. Observe that, (k
can be written as
is an encryption of 1 under identity ID, then 
One-Sided Public Openability (1SPO). If
Since the group G is an efficiently samplable and explainable domain associated with Sample and Sample
Security. We first review some mild complexity assumptions in the bilinear group (G, G T , e, p).
Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Problem. The CDH problem in G is defined as follows: Given a tuple (G, G T , e, p, g, g x , g y ) as input, where g ← G and x, y ← Z p , output g xy . The advantage of an algorithm A in solving the CDH problem is defined as Pr[A(G, G T , e, p, g, g x , g y ) = g xy ], where the probability is over the random choices of g ∈ G and x, y ∈ Z p , and the random bits of A. We say that the CDH assumption holds in G if all probabilistic polynomial time algorithms have at most a negligible advantage in solving the CDH problem in G. Decision Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) Problem. The DBDH problem in G is defined as follows: Given a tuple (G, G T , e, p, g, g x , g y , g z , e(g, g) ω ) as input, output 1 if ω = xyz and 0 otherwise. The advantage of an algorithm A in solving the DBDH problem is defined as
where the probability is over the random choices of g ∈ G and x, y, z, ω ∈ Z p , and the random bits of A. We say that the DBDH assumption holds in G if all probabilistic polynomial time algorithms have at most a negligible advantage in solving the DBDH problem in G. 
where the probability is over the random choices of g ∈ G and z 1 , z 2 , z 3 , z 4 , z ∈ Z p , and the random bits of A. We say that the DLN assumption holds in G if all probabilistic polynomial time algorithms have at most a negligible advantage in solving the DLN problem in G.
We now state the security theorem of proposed extractable 1SPO-IBE scheme. 
It also chooses two collision-resistant hash functions
and a key derivation function KDF : G T → Z p . Then, B sends the adversary the public parameter:
1. Choose two collision-resistant hash functions
5. Set the public parameter as
and the master secret key
). Obviously, from the perspective of the adversary the distribution of the public parameter is identical to the real construction. B sends the adversary the public parameter PK. Since it knows the master secret key MSK associated with PK, then B is able to answer the key generation and decryption queries made by the adversary with the help of MSK. When the adversary asks for the challenge ciphertext and session key under ID * , B chooses δ ← {0, 1} and sends
Hence, whether δ = 1 or δ = 0, from the adversary's point of view, the distribution of (C * , K * ) is identical of that in Game Real .
Suppose that event E 4 happens during the simulation, i.e., the adversary makes a decryption query for ⟨ID = ID
) and B gets (1, K) when decrypting C with the private key SK ID
Since t ̸ = t * and η d = −(η u t * + η v r * ), then with negligible probability, 
which is a solution to the CDH problem with respect to (G, G T , e, p, g, g x , g y ).
Hence, event E 4 happens with negligible probability if the CDH Assumption holds. Initially, the adversary A announces the identity ID * it wants to be challenged upon. B first sets c * 0 = g z and 
Then, it chooses two collision-resistant hash functions
and a key derivation function KDF : G T → Z p . The adversary A is provided with the public parameter
Note that, it sets α = xy and {θ i,j =θ i,j + xθ i,j } 0≤i≤3,0≤j≤2 implicitly, which are unknown by B.
Now we show that how B answers the query made by A, which is a key query for ⟨ID⟩ or a decryption query for ⟨ID, C⟩.
-When A makes a key query for ⟨ID⟩ such that ID ̸ = ID * , B first defines
Note that, with overwhelming probability,θ i ̸ = 0, sinceθ i,0 andθ i,1 are hidden by blinding factorsθ i,0 andθ i,1 , respectively. To proceed, B picks {r i ,r i } 0≤i≤3 ← Z p . It also selects {χ i } 0≤i≤3 ← Z p in a manner to be specified later. Then, B computes
)r i .
If we set r
Observe that, if ∑ 3 i=0 χ i = 1 and
is the same as in the real scheme. As shown in [10] (i.e., Theorem 6 in [10] ), ∑ 3 i=0 χ i = 1 and ∑ 3 i=0 χ iθi,2 /θ i = 0 constitute a linear system of 2 equations of 4 unknowns and admit a solution with overwhelming probability. Finally, B sends the private key SK ID to A. 
Observe that, if
can be viewed as a private key for the 2-level identity ID = (ID, ID ′ ). Similarly, ∑ 3 i=0 χ i = 1, which constitutes a linear system of 1 equation of 4 unknowns, has a solution with overwhelming probability. Next, B computes 
Finally, B sends the challenge ciphertext Proof. This argument follows almost identically to that of Lemma 13, except where the simulation is done over the parameter β in place of α. Proof. The proof is basically same as the proof of anonymity of Boyen-Waters anonymous HIBE [10] (i.e., Theorem 7 in [10] ). For ease of description, without loss of generality, we assume k = 0. We will show that Game −1 and Game 0 are computationally indistinguishable. Suppose there exists a PPT adversary A that distinguishes Game −1 and Game 0 . Then we can build an algorithm B with nonnegligible advantage in breaking DLN Assumption. B is given G, G T , e, p, g, g z 1 , g z 2 , g z 1 z 3 , g z 2 z 4 , T and will simulate Game −1 or Game 0 with A.
Initially, the adversary A announces the identity ID * it wants to be challenged upon. B first sets c * 0 = T and 
Note that, it sets a 0 = z 1 , b 0 = z 2 and {θ i,j =θ i,j + z 1θi,j } 1≤i≤3,0≤j≤2 implicitly, which are unknown by B.
-When A makes a key query for ⟨ID⟩ such that ID ̸ = ID * , B first defines ϑ 0 = θ 0,0 + 
)r′ i , 
If
Observe that, if 2 /θ i = 3θ 0,2 /ϑ 0 and
Hence, the distribution of the private key SK ID = (ID, k 0 , {k i,(a) , k i,(b) } 0≤i≤3 , w 0 ,k 0 , {k i,(a) , k i,(b) } 0≤i≤3 ,w 0 ) is the same as in the real scheme. As shown in [10] (i.e., Theorem 7 in [10] ), 
If 
Observe that, if if Note that, one can prove the computational indistinguishability of Game k−1 and Game k for each 0 < k ≤ 3 almost exactly as the above one, by exchanging the roles played by {g 0,j , h 0,j } 0≤j≤2 with those played by {g k,j , h k,j } 0≤j≤2 in the simulation, and taking case of the ramifications, etc. Specifically, a 0 , b 0 will now be chosen by B, whereas the given instance of the DLN problem will implicitly define a k = z 1 and b k = z 2 .
